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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JANE LARAWAY MILLER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
ORRIN TOWLER MILLER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 8862 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Although the appellant's statement of facts is basi-
cally correct, there are certain omissions which of neces-
sity must be called to the attention of the Court. In 
actuality, the defendant did not "lose everything," as 
alleged in appellant's brief. As shown in the Decision 
of the Court, Rendered January 4, 1957, by the Honorable 
Judge Joseph G. Jeppson (R. 2), there were other assets 
possessed by the parties, viz: an automobile, and certain 
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2 
funds that had been on deposit in the Credit Union, which 
were withdrawn by the defendant and delivered by him 
to his mother and brother, in what the ·Court may have 
considered as an effort to conceal them. The Court was 
convinced that the defendant still owned and had effective 
control over the funds (R. 2), and determined that the 
parties had a total of $13,490.00 to be divided (R~ 
Supplemental Filing). Of this amount, $5,067.00 was 
impressed by the Court with a lien to be used for the 
payment of alimony in the amount of $75.00 per month 
for a period of twenty-four months, and for support 
money in the amount of $60.00 per month. Thus, it is 
obvious that the defendant still had substantial assets and 
did not lose everything. The intent of the Court was to 
leave the defendant's salary free from any charges for 
alimony or support money and to ensure the payment 
of same. 
The defendant has frequently and bitterly complain-
ed of this decree, but it 1nust be pointed out that the 
Court, in rendering its decree, had before it both the 
plaintiff and the defendant and had opportunity, over 
the period of the trial, which extended over a period of 
two days, to observe the attitudes of the parties, and the 
Order and Decree, as issued, was not made without full 
justification. 
It must be further pointed out that the defendant 
had his remedy by appeal, but no appeal was filed from 
this decision. Defendant has, at times, throughout this 
proceeding, appeared as his own attorney, but he has also 
been adequately represented by able counsel, as an ex-
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arnination of the record will disclose. Instead of appeal 
to the Supreme Court, defendant has sought by various 
motions to have other judges of the District Court set 
aside and reverse the decision of Judge Jeppson. 
A Motion for Amendment of Decree was made by 
the defendant December 28, 1956 (R. 4). This Motion 
was filed in behalf of defendant by Keith R. Schofield, 
Esq. It was heard and denied by the Court January 17, 
1957. A second Motion for Amendment was filed on 
September 16, 1957, on behalf of defendant by Elias 
L. Day, Esq. This was heard by the Honorable Alden J. 
Anderson in October, 1957, and the defendant's motion 
to reduce the amount of support· money from $60.00 per 
month to $45.00 per month and to remove the lien from 
the savings account was again denied. A third motion, 
to release the funds in the savings account for the use of 
the defendant, was filed January 15, 1958, by James E. 
Faust, Esq., as attorney for the defendant. At the time 
this motion came up for hearing an effort was made to 
settle the controversy and terminate the litigation which 
had consumed so much time and effort and caused so 
much distress over the past year and a half. As a result 
of the negotiations in the court room of the Honorable 
Judge Stewart M. Hansen (R. 1-5, Supplemental File), 
a stipulation was entered into, in open court, whereby 
the defendant, in order to free himself of any further 
obligation to support his child, and thereby obtain the 
release of the balance of the funds on deposit in the sav-
ings account, agreed to the adoption of his daughter by 
the plaintiff's husband, Samuel Clyde Kemp, and in open 
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court, before Judge ·Hansen, ·the defendant signed the 
Consent to Adoption, which was then filed in the adop-
tion proceedings, Probate No. 40721, in the Third Dis-
trict Court' in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
By the stipulation referred to above, the impressed 
funds on deposit in The Prudential Federal Savings & 
Loan, were released to defendant and he withdrew those 
funds, in excess of $5,000.00. He presently retains these 
funds and has made no offer to replace them. In addition, 
by the terms of the stipulation, plaintiff was to reimburse 
defendant in the sum of $160.00 for attorneys fees paid by 
defendant to his attorney, James E. Faust. This sum 
was remitted to (R. 22) and received by defendant and 
has been retained by him. 
Immediately after accomplishing his primary pur-
pose of removing the lien from the savings account and 
acquiring control of the impressed funds, the defendant, 
without offering to restore any benefits received by him 
through the stipulation, next sought to relieve himself of 
his obligation under the terms of the stipulation, that of 
permitting the plaintiff's husband to adopt the child. 
Prior to obtaining the 1noney, he willingly signed, after 
.being duly apprised of his parental rights and the legal 
.consequences, before Judge Hansen, the Consent to Adop-
tion. It was after he had obtained control of the funds 
t hnt he filed, in the divorce proceedings, a Motion for 
\Vithdrawal of Consent to Adoption. Tins 1notion was 
denied by Judge Hansen, before whon1 the stipulation 
had been entered into, and fron1 this order of denial this 
appeal has been filed. 
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STATEMENT OF POINT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING TO 
DEFENDANT PERMISSION TO WITHDRAW HIS CON-
SENT FOR ADOPTION FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: 
A. DEFENDANT'S WRITTEN CONSENT WAS GIVEN 
IN OPEN COURT AS PROVIDED BY SE.CTION 78-30-8, UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED, 1953. 
B. DEFENDANT'S WRITTEN 'CONSENT WAS GIVEN 
TO CONTRACT AND AGREEMENT. 
C. DEFENDANT'S CONSENT TO ADOPTION WAS 
GIVEN IN CONSIDERATION OF AN ORDER AND DECREE 
OF COURT AND THE DEFENDANT HAS RETAINED AND 
NOT TENDERED BA·CK THE BENEFITS GRANTED TO 
HIM BY SUCH ORDER AND DECREE. 
D. THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE MINOR CHILD 
WILL BE SERVED BY PERMITTING THE CONSENT OF 




THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING TO 
DEFENDANT PERMISSION TO WITHDRAW HIS CON-
SENT FOR ADOPTION FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: 
A. DEFENDANT'S WRITTEN CONSENT WAS GIVEN 
IN OPEN COURT AS PROVIDED BY SE.CTION 78-30-8, UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED, 1953. 
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The human mind is so constituted that it is not un-
usual for a person to change his mind; to reverse a pre-
vious decision and follow a new course of action. Within 
certain limits this is necessary, proper, and even desir-
able. But there comes a point where that is neither desir-
able nor proper. Frequently persons who enter into a 
contract have a change of heart and would like to be re-
lieved of the obligations thereof; but after the contract 
has been entered into and commitments made by both 
parties, there is no backing out, and proper contracts 
will be enforced by a decree of specific performance. 
Quite often, persons marry, and to borrow the language 
from appellant's brief, "immediately realize the serious 
consequences of the thing they have done," and wish to 
repent of the marriage covenant and earnestly and sin-
cerely desire to recant that which has been done; but once 
the marriage vow has been pronounced there can be no 
withdrawal of consent. 
So, also, in the matter of adoptions, there comes a 
point where consent, once given, is, and should be, final 
and irrevocable, not only out of fairness to the parties 
already conunitted, but also out of consideration to the 
r.hild and itf' future; that it n1ight look forward to a stable, 
seeure home which is not beset with the uncertainties, 
whimf', and caprice of vacilating human emotions and 
dP<'iHions. Associate Justice ~filler of the Court of Ap-
peals of the District of Columbia in In ReAdoption of a 
Min or, 79 U.S. App. D.C. 191, 1+! F. 2d 644, 648, stated 
in for<'Pfullanguage as follows: 
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"It is apparent that if in particular cases the 
unstable whims and fancies of natural mothers 
(fathers) were permitted, first, to put in motion 
all the flow of parental love and expenditure of 
time, energy and money which is involved in adop-
tion, and then as casually put the whole process 
in reverse, the major purpose of the statute would 
be largely defeated. Doctors of medicine and of 
divinity, potential adoptive parents, and social 
workers would be stymied in their rehabilitation 
efforts. A premium would, instead, be put upon 
the emotional instability which produces illegiti-
. mates; to say nothing of the possibilities for 
racketeering which such an interpretatiton of the 
law would put in reach of those who may be crimi-
nal in their tendencies as well as lacking in the 
qualities of parenthood." 
Once written consent has been given, in open court, 
and in the manner prescribed by law, the point of no re-
turn has been reached and consent cannot be withdrawn. 
This is, as the appellant concedes, the modern rule. In 
McRae v. Lamb, 233 S.W. 2d 193, the Texas Supreme 
Court, in reviewing a prior rule, said : 
"From an examination of the reported case it 
seems that since the decision of the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court in Wyness vs. Crowley, 
1935, 292 Mass. 461, 198 N.E. 758, the rule which 
does not permit an arbitrary withdrawal of con-
sent has become the majority rule. This is indi-
cated by the annotations appearing in 138 A.L.R. 
1038 and 156 A.L.R. 1011, as well as the cases 
appearing in the pocket parts of 2 C.J.S. Adoption 
of·Children Sec. 21 (4), pg. 386." 
For many years the law of Utah has required the 
consent of the natural parents, but no particular form of 
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consent was prescribed.· The 1953 Legislature amended 
the law to add sanctity to the consent. No longer was a 
:rp.ere consent before a notary public sufficient. The law, 
as amended, was designed to make certain that the person 
giving. the consent should be fully advised as to the legal 
significance of his aet. The law, as amended, requires 
the appearance of the consenting parent before the Dis-
trict Court, and where that cannot be done, then before 
a commissioner especially appointed for the purpose. The 
consent, under these circumstances, assumes the sanctity 
and finality of the marriage vow and is, and should be 
irrevocable. 
That this is the intent and effect of the law is shown 
in the unanimous decision of the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah, where, In reAdoption of D ________ , 122 Utah 
525, 252 P. 2d 223, 230, the Court said: 
''No statutory provision specifically prohibits 
a change of mind and revocation by a parent who 
consents before a court. It is obviously unneces-
sary to so provide. These statutory provisions 
which authorize that consent be given in the pres-
ence of and with the approval of the Court certain-
ly contemplate that a consent so executed would 
be valid and binding.·· 
In the Saine case. In re .. :\ .. doption of n ________ , supra, 
the Court points out that when written surrender of n 
child to any liePnsed child placing society or agency is 
t'xecuted "the release to the agency is intended to be 
final." Should a written surrender of custody to a child 
placing agenc~· haYe any greater validity and finality 
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than a consent to adoption executed in open court b~fore 
- ' . . 
a Judge~ The D ________ case again gives the answer: 
"It would be anomalous indeed if, as the ap-
pellant contends, signing before an employee of 
the agency would have greater sanctity than one 
executed formally before the Court in the adoption 
proceeding." 
The defendant is an adult person in possession of all 
of his faculties. The record indicates that he was well 
apprised of his rights by Judge Hansen before he signed 
the adoption consent. Certainly he was aware of all the 
implications and rights involved. It has been suggested 
that the action of the defendant in signing away his child 
for a release of the lien on money impounded for the 
child's benefit is akin to selling away the child. This 
question was considered by the Supreme Court of New 
Mexico in Barwin v. Reidy, 307 P. 2d 175,184. The parents 
sold their child, which action the Court soundly con-
demned, but added : 
"But denouncing the acts of the adults does 
not settle the question of what happens to the 
children. Can it be said that natural parents may 
sell their children, enjoy the proceeds and then 
come into Court and demand the return of their 
children~ If so, what would there be in law to 
prevent their selling the children over and over 
again~ The answer is clear-the act of selling 
children constitutes abandonment of them as a 
matter of law. In fact, we can think of no more 
drastic way in which children could be abandoned 
unless it be simply to leave them alone and <'X~ 
posed to the elements." 
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In the case now before the Court the statutory pro-
visions for obtaining the consent of the father were me-
ticulously followed, and the consent, once given, is irre-
vocabel, and certainly the defendant does not have the 
right to withdraw his consent as a matter of law. 
B. DEFENDANT'S WRITTEN CONSENT WAS GIVEN 
PURSUANT TO CONTRACT AND AGREEMENT. 
Because of the haphazard manner in which this pro-
ceeding has been handled, the record before the Court is 
not as clear as it should be. As is evident from the second 
paragraph of appellant's Statement of Case, pg. 1 of 
Appelllant's Brief, defendant's motion to set aside the 
consent was improperly numbered and filed in case No. 
106986. To have been effective it should have been num-
bered and filed in the adoption proceeding. Respondent 
was not required to and made no effort to present testi-
mony in opposition to appellant's motion. All that re-
spondent was required to do and all that she did do at 
the hearing on the motion was to show its invalidity, 
and the Court thereupon denied the motion (R. 20). 
It will be noted that the motion of February 19, 1958, 
on which the order was based from which defendant is 
now appealing, 1nerely required the plaintiff to "appear 
... within five days to show cause for breach." (R. 18). 
The plaintiff appeared, showed that there was no breach, 
and the Court denied the motion. No evidence was called 
for as to the contract upon which defendant's consent was 
based. 
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Hence, there is no record of the underlying agree-
ment which constituted the consideration for the execu-
tion of the consent to adoption, save and except the trans-
cription of the stipulation, which was filed in the Supreme 
Court on June 16, 1958. Nevertheless, it is conceded by 
appellant that the release of the lien on the impressed 
money (R. 19) and the payment of appellant's attorney 
fee in the sum of $160.00, were "given in consideration of 
defendant's signing a consent for Samuel Clyde Kemp 
to adopt his (defendant's) child." 
Now note the position in which the minor child will 
be placed if defendant is permitted, in breach of his agree-
ment, to withdraw his consent. Prior to the signing of 
the consent for adoption and the release of the lien, the 
child had the security of a home with its mother and 
foster father, and also the security of a substantial sum 
of money, impressed with a lien for the child's benefit. 
After the signing of the consent and the release of the 
lien on the funds the . child had lost the security of the 
impounded money, but was in position to receive, instead, 
the security of a home in which it would have a legal 
right to support from the adopting father, including 
rights of inheritance. This right the defendant would 
deny his child if he is permitted to breach his agreement 
and withdraw his consent. 
That parents may bind themselves by contract to 
permit the adoption of their children has been decided 
by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah in the case 
referred to above, In re Adoption of D ________ , supra, the 
syllabus of which reads as follows: 
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"Contracts for adoption, fairly and volun~ 
tarily entered into, are valid as between the par-
ties, hut will not be enforced to the detriment of 
the child. U.C.A. 1953, 55-8-2(c), 55-10-42, 78-30-
4, 78-30-8." 
This case merely followed a previous Utah decision 
which has remained unchanged for almost half a century, 
Stanford v. Gray, 42 Utah 228, 129 P. 423, in which the 
Court decided: 
"The great weight of authority however, sus-
tains the position that a parent may by contract 
legally transfer and surrender his infant child into 
the custody of another where the interest of the 
child is not prejudiced by the transaction." 
Numerous authorities are then cited by the Court. 
C. DEFENDANT'S CONSENT TO ADOPTION WAS 
GIVEN IN CONSIDERATION OF AN ORDER AND DECREE 
OF COURT AND THE DEFENDANT HAS RETAINED AND 
NOT TENDERED BACK THE BENEFITS GRANTED TO 
HIM BY SUCH ORDER AND DECREE. 
As hereinabove set forth. the consent to adoption 
executed h~· the defendant was based upon the considera-
tion of tlw release by the Court of the lien on the savings 
account on deposit at Prudential Federal Savings and 
Loan, and thr payn1ent by plaintiff to defendant of the 
attornr~· fee incurred by hiln in the an1ount of $160.00. 
The mon(l~· in the savings account was released upon 
stipulation of C'e()unsel and order of court (R. 19). It is 
:-\hown hY thP record (R. 20) that defendant had this 
Htipulation in his possession at the tin1e he appeared in 
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13 
court on his motion to withdraw consent; denial of which 
gave rise to this appeal. Defendant withdrew the funds 
from the savings account. He received (R. 22) payment 
of the attorneys fee. Thus, he has accepted and retained 
all of the benefits granted to him by the stipulation and 
~ourt order. Defendant has not tendered back the bene-
fits which he received; nothing has been restored. 
There is an ancient maxim in equity, "He that seeks 
equity must do equity." This Court in In re Adoption of 
D ________ , supra, declared an adoption proceeding to be 
"equitable in the highest degree." Certainly, upon equita-
ble grounds the defendant is not entitled to the equitable 
relief of being able to withdraw his consent to adoption. 
But there is a further principle in this connection 
which precludes granting to defendant the relief he seeks. 
This ·Court has repeatedly held that where a party ac-
cepts the benefits of a decree he waives his right to appeal 
and will not be heard to complain of those parts of the 
judgment which he finds objectionable. Thus, in Cornia 
v. Cornia, 80 Utah 486, 15 P. 2d 631, the appellants recog-
nized the validity of a decree by accepting the benefits of 
the same in their favor. The Court said: 
"For these reasons they have waived their 
right to appeal, and are estopped from claiming 
the right to have the decree reviewed by this court. 
The following cases and authorities will be found 
to sustain the foregoing conclusions: 3 C.J. ()();), 
Sec. 536; Ottenheimer v. Mountain States Supply, 
56 Utah 190, 188 P. 1117; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. 
Industrial Commission, 73 Utah 366, 274 P. 139; 
Albright v. Oyster (C.C.A.) 60 F. 644." . 
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Mr. Miller: Yes. 
The Court: And is it your desire at this time 
to· sign this consent, consenting that the child 
be adopted by your former wife's present husband 
and herself~ 
Mr. Miller : I do. 
The Court: And is anybody forcing you to 
do this~ 
Mr. Miller: No. I will make a statement what 
the money i·s for if you would like to hear it. 
The Court : You are doing this though of your 
own free will and consent~ 
Mr. Miller: Yes. 
It should also be noted that Mr. Miller was sworn 
by the clerk of the eourt before he gave this testimony. 
The defendant's interest in money, rather than his 
child and her welfare, is further illustrated by defendant's 
petition, through his attorney, Elias L. Day, on Septem-
ber 13, 1957, to have the order for child support reduced 
fron1 $60.00 per Inonth to $45.00 per month (R. 8). This 
was done in spite of the fact that shortly before that 
time defendant's salary was increased from $400.00 per 
Inonth to $525.00 per month (R. 10). In the face of this 
overwhehning evidence showing defendant's callous, 
materialistic behavior, towards his daughter, the appel-
lant would have the Court believe that it was his love and 
concern for the child's welfare that prompted him to 
Ino~e to withdraw his consent to adoption. (Appellant's 
Brief, page 12) "Certainly the child's welfare cannot be 
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enhanced by depriving her -of this love, support, and 
attention to which she· is entitled under the law." What 
love~ What support, other than that ordered by the 
Court and to which the defendant objected and moved 
to reduce~ What attention from the defendant~ Who has 
supported this child since defendant withdrew the funds 
from impressed savings account in February of 1958 ~ 
For what it may be worth, as an indication of the 
unstable nature and disposition of the defendant, re-
spondent respectfully calls the Court's attention to the 
fact that throughout the course of these proceedings the 
defendant has deemed it necessary to change attorneys 
at frequent intervals. In addition to other counsel with 
whom defendant has discussed this matter, the record will 
show the following attorneys to have appeared for de-
fendant at various times: 
Paul E. Reimann, who filed defendant's Answer. 
Richards & Bird and Keith Schofield, who repre-
sented defendant at the trial. 
Elias L. Day, who appeared on motion for amend-
ment of decree. 
James E. Faust, who appeared on a similar mo-
tion. 
David E. West, who filed defendant's appeal brief. 
The Court is aware of the ability and integrity of 
these worthy members of the bar. Although appellant'::; 
brief alleges in several places that defendant was without 
legal counsel, it seems improbable that he suffered from 
lack of legal assistance. Nevertheless, he has still found 
it necessary to appear in his own behalf, without legal 
counsel, at various times, and in particular at the time 
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of ·preparaticm and presentation in court of· the motion 
and order which is the subject of this appeal. At the 
present time ,he- has discharged his legal counsel, Mr. 
West, and- is again without counsel. One can only con-
chide from- this parade of legal counsel that the defend~ 
ant refuses to heed the advice of his attorneys, thereby 
coJ!lpelling their withdrawal, or he changes his mind so 
frequently ·as to be wholly unpredictable. His execution 
of the adoption consent and then the professed immediate 
repentence therefrom is further evidence of defendant's 
instability. 
The appellant, in his brief, asserts that there are no 
"invested rights" in this case. 
"In analyzing those cases which have de-
prived the natural parents the right to withdraw 
a consent, it is particularly noted that they in-
variably involve a situation where the child has 
been placed in a new home for a substantial period 
of time and the bonds of affection have been 
forged between the new parents and the child. 
Under such circumstances, courts have been re-
luctant to uproot the child from its environment. 
or to destroy a new parental relationship which 
has arisen." (Appellant's Brief, pg. 9.) 
Attention is called to the fact that the child has been 
living. with the adopting father since his marriage to 
the_plaintiff July 26, 1957, which is well over a year, and 
certainly time enough for a strong parental attachment 
and po:p.d to develop; and such relationship would surely 
be destroyed if defendant were allowed to prevail in this 
appeal. ,Mr. ICemp, the adopting father, is the only father 
thi~ child has known, £or all practical purposes. 
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What positive contributions to the welfare ·of this 
ehild woUld be effected if defendant's appeal were de.:. 
nied and the consent of adoption was to stand and the 
adoption was to be fully consumated ~ Primarily, and of 
greatest importance, she would have the security of a 
real, full-time father who loved her and wanted her to 
such an extent as to choose her to become his own daugh-
ter. Mr. Kemp, the adopting father, is the only real 
father this child has known. She would have the security 
of having the same name as her mother as well as her 
new father. This is important to children. She would 
be enveloped in the warmth of a stable; secure, mature 
home and a peaceful, harmonious environment. She would 
have not only the right to inherit from the defendant, 
her natural father, but also to inherit from her adopted 
father, Mr. Kemp. (See In re Benner's Estate, 109 Utah 
172, 166 P. 2d 257.) 
If the defendant prevails in this appeal the child 
will be caught up in the turmoil of divided loyalties moti-
vated by possible sporadic visits from a stranger who 
professes to be her father. The very real possibility, 
yea probability, of open competition between natural 
mother and natural father for the control of the child, 
which often results in "parental bribery" of a child's 
affections with utter disregard for sensible limits and 
discipline and the child's well-being. A step-father with-
out rights, even though he should be the one to exercise 
and create the balance in a well adjusted home, because 
of the necessity of having to compete with another man 
for the loyalties and respect of his step-daughter. The 
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confusion of bearing a name different from that of her 
mother., The emotional upset of knowing that she doesn't 
really "belong" anywhere. The tension of never knowing 
when or where her natural father will appear to upset 
the home once again. It seems impossible, as the District 
Court records are examined revealing the strife and tur-
moil of the plaintiff's and defendant's marital relation-
ships, and as the defendant's behavior in the past is re-
viewed as regarding his instability and lack of interest 
in his child, to conceive of this child ever achieving a 
normal, happy; stable and secure life if the defendant's 
appeal is granted. It would be cruel to the child to sub-
ject her to the turmoils that are here evident. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court has held in In reAdoption of D ____ , supra, 
'"The parents consent to adoption, once voluntarily given 
and acted upon by adopting parents, cannot be with-
drawn without good cause." It is respectfully submitted 
that the appellant has not shown good cause for such 
a withdrawal; that it would be for the best interests of 
the minor child to be adopted, and that the Court should 
affirn1 the order of the District Court denying defend-
ant the right to withdraw his consent. 
Respectfully subn1itted, 
REGNAL "\V. GARFF, JR. 
Attorney for Respondent 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
